Yes!, in terms of how early you staked, but if someone staked a huge amount early on, then they would take a significant amount of the “spots” available to get the airdrop. This is NOT a meaningful inequality though in my opinion, as the airdrop only represented a very small portion of the SWISE in circulation and also meant that there was extra incentive to stake with StakeWise, other than all the other cool stuff about it.
It helps, but that could never really be fixed (in my view), hence me pointing out why it’s not my intention to “fix” it, but rather to help reduce it in the future somewhat.
As specified in SWIP-3, there is intention to create a future proposal in order to incentivize the pools with 0.6% (sETH2/ETH) and 0.2% (rETH2/sETH2) of the supply monthly (if I understand correctly). This incentivization will come later, after the pools are already set up and through a governance proposal → DAO vote.
The percentages obviously are subject to change given the appropriate discussion or so in the forum with respect to that future incentivization proposal. The incentives will come in the shape of $SWISE, as with the 1INCH/SWISE pool.
Hahaha thanks, it’s nothing amazing, I was just having fun with it.
Yes, in terms of the StakeWise airdrop I understand why the incentives could be perceived as such, but in terms of Uniswap pools, while there is risk, the risk is really very low at this point. Uniswap is heavily battle tested, has been audited a bunch of times and has been running without hiccups since V1 like 2 years ago or so. In terms of what risks could exist in terms of loss of funds or something of the sort, we can consider Uniswap as low as it gets.
Also those users are still very heavily benefitted, as they still claim significantly larger rewards than smaller wallets.
My concern with inequality is not necessarily the problem of wealth itself, but the fact that the incentivization of pools is done not just through Uniswap trading fees (which are understandably going to be larger for larger wallets), but through governance tokens.
Given that, by rewarding already large holders of SWISE with a linearly distributed amount of SWISE depending on their holdings, you’re allocating a lot of (essentially free) voting power to wallets that already have a lot of voting power, and that unlike smaller wallets, can move the price of the token very heavily by selling part of their share.
If a DAO’s objective is to eventually be as democratic as possible, it would be reasonable to allocate rewards more equitably, because in this case rewards = voting power.
Raising the amount of ETH to powers between 0 and 1 seems to not flatten the curve very much, and messes around the APR which is calculated in USD/Fiat value anyway. In the attached plot the APR is calculated using the value at the time of writing the post of SWISE as shown in Coingecko (if i recall correctly it was ~0.055 USD per SWISE).