Updated SWISE Tokenomics via Dynamic Liquidity Provision (dLP) Staking

I’ve been mulling over the tokenomics for v3 a bit. I know some expressed a preference for more engaging (high yield) incentives compared to the latest xSWISE proposal. While the previous proposal delegated the allocation of the remaining SWISE in treasury (~350M per my calculations) to management discretion to drive TVL growth, there is a potential to include these in the tokenomics themselves. With this in mind, I’ve revisited our tokenomics with a focus on offering enticing yields that are sustainable and would address two key goals: 1) incentivizing new ETH deposits and 2) enhancing the liquidity of SWISE/osETH on-chain, which has recently been problematic.

The new tokenomics would retain the same revenue share/insurance model of the previous xSWISE proposal (borrowed from xMPL tokenomics) for regular way staking with a slight tweak in that staking is done in the form of an 80/20% SWISE/osETH LP position instead of single-side staking. Adding on top of this – we go with a novel tokenomic concept known as “dynamic liquidity provision” (dLP), which has yielded significant success for Radiant Capital, boasting TVL growth to >$300M in the past six months. (see Radiant dLP Discussion / Docs)

I encourage everyone to read up on Radiant’s dLP approach but to summarize – it involves an ingenious incentive structure for attracting TVL while liming the typical farm/dump issues common with protocol incentives. In order to be eligible for the incentivized RDNT emissions rate for deposited capital, users must stake/maintain >5% of the capital $ amount in an 80/20% RDNT/ETH BAL ‘dLP’ pool. This not only curbs short-term, profit-driven behavior but also fosters long-term, committed investors, all the while improving RDNT/ETH liquidity.

I think we could do something similar with SWISE - adopting this same dLP tokenomics design to direct SWISE rewards to ETH/osETH minters. This would involving establish a 7-year emissions curve for the ~350M remaining SWISE in our community treasury, offering these as incentives to osETH holders as additional yield on their deposits, given that they also hold/stake >5% of that dollar amount in a SWISE/osETH 80/20% BAL pool ‘dLP’ across various v3 vaults.

The proposal includes the following notable features:

  • Incentivizes new osETH deposits: With the right emissions curve (7-year with 30% yr 1 declining to 5% in year 7), we could attract a substantial influx of new ETH deposits as incentive yields >25-30% kicking of the flywheel that v3 deserves
  • Provides attractive yield opportunity to incentivize SWISE stakers to stake/insure v3 vaults
  • Enhances overall SWISE/osETH liquidity on-chain.
  • Opt-in Participation: ETH depositors/vault operators who prefer not to participate don’t have to, and can stake/open vaults in v3 as usual (no one is forced into this)
  • SWISE price stability: In the long run, SWISE would have a more direct relationship with ETH, similar to RPL. If the price declines, the SWISE $ value in dLPs decline, slowing down SWISE emissions and encouraging ‘farmers’ to augment their SWISE/osETH dLP position

This approach, albeit complex at first glance, has an elegant simplicity under the hood and could offer a sustainable way to integrate SWISE incentives into our protocol. I’d love to hear everyone’s thoughts on this proposition.

I plan to liaise with the Radiant team next week to dive into the details/get insights into their considerations/experience from actually implementing Dynamic Liquidity Provisioning dLP, both from technical and incentive perspectives so we can hit the ground running if SWISE community/team are on board with moving in this direction.

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You can add a payment for trades with StakeWise smart contracts. this fee will be sent to the swiss/oseth pool. Slightly 0.01%

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gm everybody :coffee:

@Steel.Key thank you kindly for the extensive write-up on here & Discord! I have been playing with a similar idea in my head, actually, but without the LP token component. IMO this kind of tokenomics has the potential to incentivize TVL growth, distribute voting power among the most active users of the protocol, and help combat some potential issues with the peg (i.e. protect against premium on osETH). Personally, I really like it, and consensus within the team is that it is (at least) very interesting to explore.

Below I will summarize the mechanics and the changes that would be required for the implementation of this tokenomics design, so that other SWISE holders (for whom crypto is not full-time) could better understand the merits of the proposal and potential implications. I will also present some questions that I would like for us to have answered collectively before we move to the temperature check stage.

Mechanics: put SWISE and/or ETH into the SWISE/ETH liquidity pool on Balancer (single-sided addition possible if you don’t have both) → receive LP tokens → stake LP tokens alongside your ETH stake in Vaults → mint osETH → receive SWISE rewards. Participation in the mechanism is meant to be optional.

Conditions: value of LP tokens (i.e. value of liquidity position) must be >5% of the value of your liquid stake in Vault(s)

Where rewards come from: proposal suggests establishing a reserve of X SWISE in the DAO Treasury that would be periodically distributed among everyone who meets the criteria. The idea is to commit to the release of tokens from the reserve based on a specific emission schedule, i.e. 7-year release period with more tokens released in the beginning of the period than in the end (“the emissions curve”). For example, this could be split into the following chunks (in terms of % from the total reserve paid in a given year): 25/20/15/15/10/10/5. Or it could be 20/20/20/10/10/10/10, or anything else really. The crux is that the emissions schedule is known in advance and the DAO commits to it long-term so that anyone who stakes LP tokens alongside their ETH can have a relatively predictable yield.

Benefits: increases the attractiveness of staking ETH & minting osETH with StakeWise due to offering additional incentives to choose it vs the competition, distributes protocol voting rights to arguably the most active users, improves liquidity for SWISE, creates buying pressure for SWISE.

Risks: introduces potentially too high a token emission schedule (vs amount of liquidity available), reduces protocol’s runway for liquidity incentives, maintaining >5% of ETH stake’s value in LP tokens may be clunky and/or expensive.

Some napkin math: if we allocated 200M of the 350M SWISE currently remaining in the DAO Treasury towards this initiative and went with the 25/20/15/15/10/10/5 emission schedule, here is what the yield could look like at different levels of participation (essentially % of circulating supply participating in the tokenomics):

Yield from emissions 10% participation 20% participation 30% participation 50% participation 75% participation
Year 1 95.24% 47.62% 31.75% 19.05% 12.70%
Year 2 69.57% 34.78% 23.19% 13.91% 9.28%
Year 3 48.78% 24.39% 16.26% 9.76% 6.50%
Year 4 46.51% 23.26% 15.50% 9.30% 6.20%
Year 5 29.63% 14.81% 9.88% 5.93% 3.95%
Year 6 28.78% 14.39% 9.59% 5.76% 3.84%
Year 7 13.99% 6.99% 4.66% 2.80% 1.86%

APR from SWISE emissions

Note that these figures are based on emissions alone (ie quantity growth) and do not factor in any potential SWISE price changes. Here’s the link if you want to play around with this simple model: dLP Tokenomics napkin math - Google Sheets

Desired effect from this mechanism: increased demand for staking with StakeWise owing to ~0.5-5% boost to ETH yield (from 10-100% yield received in SWISE) and increased demand for SWISE to take advantage of the opportunity. Increases in TVL and demand for the token can potentially lead to higher returns than mentioned in the table above if the token price appreciates (ie total return = emissions yield + price appreciation), further fueling the demand for both. A flywheel effect is possible whereby increases in TVL could lead to increased demand for the token, leading to price appreciation, leading to increased yield from staking with StakeWise, leading to more demand to stake and growth in TVL, and so on. Note this is purely hypethetical and should not be treated as investment advice - I am just voicing opinions.

Important considerations: I believe we should add some conditions like amount of osETH minted relative to one’s stake in a Vault, limits to how much emissions one should be able to claim based on the size of SWISE LP position, and methods of distributing the emissions so as to simplify participation in the tokenomics.

Condition about osETH minted: within the V3 model, StakeWise DAO earns fees based on the volume of osETH minted, and distributing SWISE to incentivize simply staking ETH in Vaults wouldn’t necessarily convert token emissions into more revenue for the protocol. To ensure that it does, I suggest that minting osETH should be a requirement to start receiving one’s share of emissions. Because every user has a certain max amount of osETH they can mint, I suggest that emissions are tied to how much they minted vs their maximum, with those who max out receiving the full emissions they’re eligible for, and those who only minted a small amount receiving proportionately less.

  • Example: I staked 100 ETH in a Vault and added 5 ETH worth of SWISE LP tokens alongside it to participate in the dLP program. If I mint the maximum amount of osETH (90% LTV), then I participate in the dLP to the max extent (essentially claiming 100% of the emissions I am eligible for). If I mint let’s say 50% of my max (45% LTV), then I should only receive 50% of the maximum possible amount of emissions.

Condition about the limits: in order to properly align the emissions of SWISE with the protocol’s power users, I suggest that SWISE LP positions that are larger than 5% of the ETH staked in a Vault are still compensated as if they are exactly 5% of the ETH stake. This would encourage people to maximize their ETH stake in the protocol to take full advantage of the emissions based on their existing SWISE ownership, and allow an average user to effectively compete for emissions against large SWISE holders who are not power users of the protocol.

  • Example: I staked 100 ETH in a Vault and added 10 ETH worth of SWISE LP tokens alongside it to participate in the dLP program. I minted 90 osETH to maximize my emissions. However, I will only earn the amount of emissions that 5 ETH worth of SWISE LP tokens would be eligible for, despite having 10 ETH worth. To take full advantage of my 10 ETH liquidity position, I would try selling 90 osETH on the market and restaking the proceeds into one of the Vaults, then minting osETH again. My total stake would be ~190 ETH, total osETH position would be 90 + 81 = 171 osETH, and I would be eligible for almost maximum SWISE emissions because now the value of my SWISE LP tokens is ~5% of my total stake (10 / 190 ~ 5%). This logic is powerful for advanced users.

Condition about the distribution of rewards: I believe that participation in the tokenomics should be seamless, to the extent that if sufficient amount of liquidity (5% of one’s stake) is added to the SWISE liquidity pool from a certain wallet, we should be able to recognize this and make the address eligible for the emissions without requiring to stake LP tokens, for example. Exiting from the tokenomics program should be equally seamless, where withdrawing liquidity would automatically cease the distribution of rewards. I also believe that rewards distribution should be done weekly on a certain day of the week, with the payout for the past <=7 days of participation paid out in two tranches: 50% immediately, and 50% in another week. I recognize this may not be very straightforward, but this is a little similar to the Balancer’s old rewards distribution model which I personally like. I will provide an illustration of the mechanism in a while for everyone’s comprehension, but here’s an example.

  • Example: I staked 100 ETH in a Vault and added 5 ETH worth of SWISE LP tokens alongside it to participate in the dLP program. I minted the maximum amount of osETH to be eligible for maximum emissions. After 2 days it is the emissions distribution day, where I get credited 2 days worth of emissions. Of these 50% are immediately claimable and another 50% are claimable after 7 days. In a week’s time, it is the emissions distribution day again, where I get credited 7 days worth of emissions. Of these 50% are immediately claimable (alongside the 50% from the amount credited for the first 2 days) and another 50% are claimable after 7 days. And so on.

If we add these conditions to @Steel.Key 's original proposal, I believe we will create an even fairer tokenomics model with emissions and distribution methods optimized for simple UX and growth.

Perhaps for some parting thoughts, the team has always toyed with the idea of suggesting SWISE incentives to stake with StakeWise, but tying this to liquidity provision for the token itself, and some form of token ownership in order to be eligible for the emissions is a powerful way to create more demand for the token and give more power to the long-term supporters and users of StakeWise.

I look forward to hearing everyone’s thoughts on the topic!

PS. And remember - while I have tried to break down the proposed mechanism and desired effects as well as possible so that even the people without substantial knowledge of tokenomics designs could assess the forces at play, if you have questions or don’t think you understand something well enough, feel free to ask for a clarification. I love this community and want everyone to take part in this discussion. LFG!

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In my opinion, future emission should not exceed the current one. If the total allocation is 200 million, then the decrease should be more gradual, for example 20 20 15 15 10 10 10

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Is there any utility for Swise as well? Does it include protocol revenue sharing towards staked Swise? Does Swise play any other roles to strengthen the protocol, such as security or insurance? I’m by no means an expert, nor a full-time tokenomics philosopher, but it seems to me that without these, the token might trend towards zero value. Would that be a correct assumption?

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There is definitely utility for SWISE in both rev share from osETH minting, insurance for vault deposits in v3 (in the form of either the SWISE/ETH dLP positions or single side staking SWISE that are still part of broader tokenomics here) as well as general governance value in having the ability to dictate the future direction of the DAO which does have value though harder to quantify for sure (LDO doesn’t have “utility” currently but the optionality to dictate changes to a deposit pool of that size is not worthless/trending to zero)

I think it would be helpful to separate the tokenomics discussion into two parts - (1) Revenue Share vs (2) SWISE Emissions Incentives - so its more clear for everyone. Its important to understand the dLP discussions we have been having are largely around SWISE Emissions Incentives and putting a formalized structure around that.

  • Revenue Share – v3 DAO revenue comes from osETH minting fees (~5% of ETH staking rewards) and with v3 launch the plan is to have the option to single side staking SWISE (via xSWISE) to one or more vaults as a form of insurance against tail risk slashing events in exchange for a split of DAO Revenue.
  • SWISE Emissions Incentive – this is where the SWISE emissions schedule to dLP holders of 80/20 SWISE/ETH BAL pool comes in which many feel is an elegant solution to distribute a portion of the 350M SWISE we have in Treasury to new osETH minters/active users in v3 while disincentivizing typical farm & dump issues seen with large emissions schedules. (ex. The other option would be to just give 1-2% yield in SWISE emissions to osETH depositors but there is nothing stopping them from simply selling SWISE immediately, creating significant downward pressure on the token/lowering future yields) These dLP positions can be pledge as collateral to specific vaults as well for slashing insurance while at the same time remaining productive in the Balancer SWISE/ETH LP pool.

Hope this is helpful – but to summarize – revenue share is very much still a part of the discussion here and will come to SWISE single side stakers via xSWISE. The 80/20 SWISE/ETH balancer dynamic liquidity provision emissions schedule is separate from that as a go to market push to get StakeWise v3 to scale of ~300K osETH so we can go head to head with Lido & Rocketpool on quality of the product itself.

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So currently there is no emission schedule to incentivize sETH2 deposits to replace. We do distribute 500K SWISE a month to the SWISE/sETH2 pool (or roughly 6M SWISE/year) which you can see the SWISE/ETH dLP emission schedule effectively replacing while also incentivizing a massive influx of new osETH deposits as well. So this isn’t really a defensive emission schedule to maintain liquidity but a proactive sprint to gain share. I can understand the hesitation on emissions and definitely a balancing act but if done correctly – higher emissions will result in faster osETH deposit growth which is exactly what we are looking to do. I do think that we perhaps separate it into two different votes - (1) on the concept of moving forward with dLP as a tokenomic framework for emission incentives and subsequently (2) the total SWISE commited/emission schedule cadence after that. I’m fine with a middle ground approach though.

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Just wanted to get a quick temperature check on where everyone’s head is at on this so we can assess the best way to proceed further (if at all) - whether it be more in depth discussions on specific concerns or a DAO teach-in/discussion on various concepts more broadly, etc.

Thoughts on dLP Tokenomics Proposal for StakeWise v3 Incentives
  • I like it and think we should commit dev resources to it
  • I like it generally but have some specific concerns
  • I don’t understand it and need more information
  • I don’t like it at all

0 voters

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Thank you for this. And with Kiriyhas examples I think I understand it and I like the swise emission proposal.

Just a question, is there impermanent loss risk in the balancer pool?

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Thanks!
Nice to read your feedback

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Can you explain a bit more about the importance of the ‘specific emission schedule’?

Purely from a technical standpoint, I would propose opting for a continuously decreasing emission schedule.

It would allow for slightly higher rewards in the initial weeks/months to attract early adopters. Additionally, I’ve observed discussions in other protocols about cliff moments, unlocks, or yield drops. With a continuous curve, such discussions are less likely to arise.

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Hey - so yes, there would be IL risk in the balancer pool but the expected APR is quite high relative to the LP size (especially in year 1& 2 when IL risk is highest) to hopefully provide adequate compensation for that risk. That said - this won’t be for everyone or everyone’s entire SWISE holdings for those who do participate (ex. I intend to convert ~50% of my SWISE holdings to the dLP - though exact amount will be a calculation based on the total osETH I end up minting (to be just over the required min %))

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Great comment! Definitely agree - a continuously decreasing emission schedule would remove the “cliff moments” when yields might have step function changes.

Blockquote I also believe that rewards distribution should be done weekly on a certain day of the week, with the payout for the past <=7 days of participation paid out in two tranches: 50% immediately, and 50% in another week.

In that same vein @kiriyha I know you mentioned weekly distribution via the old Balancer pool model - is there a technical reason we can’t do that continuously as well? In the same vein as doing a continous decreasing emission schedule, having weekly claim cliffs also adds some risk on abrupt removal of capital around these schedules (& given the reflexivity/game theory of crypto at times- even the expectation of this action by some could cause it to occur by others)

I’m not opposed to the weekly distribution but if we do that - we definitely need to consider doing a similar dLP lock period as Radiant does so have staggered dLP expirations/cliffs (ex. locking dLP for longer [ex. 1mo, 3mo, 6mo or 1 year] has a higher relative weighting [ex. 1x, 2x, 3x & 6x] for the SWISE emissions) I know some people are totally opposed to lock periods but again this isn’t for everyone or all of a person SWISE holdings either.

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Ok, thanks :+1:. With a 5% limit you would need to be a fairly large staker to be able to really benefit from it I guess. But with a lower limit, it means higher APR on the other hand, with a fixed amount of emission, so I get the point of having a limit.

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Ok, when I think about it, it would significantly increase the staking yield, with a couple of percent, so if you consider it worth staking your eth, it would be worth it to do the dLP.

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Ya - its a balancing act. There is a also an osETH looping scenario that Kirill referred to as well (deposit ETH → mint osETH → sell to ETH > mint more osETH) which is definitely farther out on the risk curve but can also scale up ones total osETH balance beyond simply what current ETH balance is. As a side note - Radiant actually has their own looping strategy for power users within their protocol which is why this tokenomic model would fit so nicely into SWISE v3.

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Yes, the looping sounded interesting. I’ll need to read up on it to understand exactly what kind of risks it would have.

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I also have a more fundamental remark, let me try to explain.

I don’t fully agree with the concept of tokenomics having separate parts. Different components should reinforce each other. Revenu sharing, token emission; there should be an underlying philosophy.

Controlled emissions could benefit long-term users, both in terms of emissions and revenu sharing, providing a competitive advantage. The current proposal seems to focus on rewarding new power users who are willing to take on high risks, as minting lst adds risk. This emission proposal shouldn’t prioritize risk maximization above core values. I think.

The upcoming launch phase offers an opportunity, and need, to attract new influential users. A team will be formed to incentivize various liquidity pools under the mandate of the DAO, which I support. For short-term initial market penetration of oseth, the initial boost of osETH quantity, I prefer the practical approach with a dedicated team and budget. I believe they can achieve this with significantly fewer emissions and greater efficiency. -Rewarding oseth minting could be part of the mandate during launch fase-.

After a while, if integration progress is succesvol, volume becomes more important than quantity and the effectiveness of this seven-year emission would be questionable. Token emissions should have a clear purpose rather than being done just because they can be done. I think that strong alignment builds a better community. More purpose.

I suggest exploring alternatieve reward structures, such as rewarding node and vault operators with SWISE in line with the future node/vault ranking system. Validator contributions to diversity and use of dvt for expl. should be considered for extra SWISE emissions. While the current proposal focuses exclusively on reward for minting and looping oseth -risk-. I believe there are other valuable aspects we can and should incentivize. The ‘ranking’, algorithm or committee, could play a role in SWISE emission to encourage desired behavior and reward new (power) users.

I think there is a lot to be said for the proposed technique. There seems to be a very solid mechanism behind it, and I also think using a ceiling is a good idea. I believe the proposed system is solid for rewarding and retaining new users, but there are opportunities for improvement and a more holistic approach to tokenomics, more alignment.

tldr

  • Exclusively rewarding risk maximization feels somewhat “hollow.”
  • Long-term emission programs provide an opportunity to stimulate and reward core values. Connect this with the node/vault ranking system.
  • the proposed emission technique seems very solid.
  • The launch phase demands rapid quantity and substantial volume, which can be achieved with a proactive team. This enhances capital efficiency and prevents unnecessary dilution.
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Thanks to the great contributions on this @Steel.Key @mcdutchy !

In that same vein @kiriyha I know you mentioned weekly distribution via the old Balancer pool model - is there a technical reason we can’t do that continuously as well? In the same vein as doing a continous decreasing emission schedule, having weekly claim cliffs also adds some risk on abrupt removal of capital around these schedules (& given the reflexivity/game theory of crypto at times- even the expectation of this action by some could cause it to occur by others)

No difference technically, the reason I proposed this is because of the way such distribution can influence decision making. At any given time, when you are deciding whether to withdraw, you would have the decision to either claim the accumulated amount of rewards and ignore the amount you’re supposed to receive in a week, or wait a week and claim the “full” amount, and so on in perpetuity. Simply seeing how much you can claim extra if you wait another week imo really plays into people’s pursuit of yield to the protocol’s benefit. We’re not rational beings so better to use it to our advantage. LMK your thoughts on this.

I’m not opposed to the weekly distribution but if we do that - we definitely need to consider doing a similar dLP lock period as Radiant does so have staggered dLP expirations/cliffs (ex. locking dLP for longer [ex. 1mo, 3mo, 6mo or 1 year] has a higher relative weighting [ex. 1x, 2x, 3x & 6x] for the SWISE emissions) I know some people are totally opposed to lock periods but again this isn’t for everyone or all of a person SWISE holdings either.

Hmm what is your thinking here? Why would it need to become a requirement? Personally I think it complicates things.

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Aww - ok. No I like the idea of a deffered amount into the next week. Just has some concern if the rewards calculation is done weekly or continuously (weighted based $ amount & on how long you have been doing dLP)

If its done weekly - ex. if I’ve been a dLP for 5 days for $100 before the weekly distribution and someone comes in the day before for same $100 - and we get the same amount - then there is some chunkiness on when people might add to their dLP “on the way in” and likely “on the way out” where everyone who was going to leave in a given week, leaves dLP/sells SWISE on the same day (though the deferred amount does offset that cliff somewhat)

Ya - don’t want to overcomplicate things and the deferred Balancer rewards amount does offset the weekly rewards “cliffs” Its just a question of how far along the “mercenary capital resistance scale” you want to go. dLP obviously goes a long way but locking that dLP would be even higher up on the scale.

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